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Introduction
High-speed access to the web appears to have enjoyed a considerable rate of growth in Europe
in 2001. To a great many observers, the challenges surrounding this development – which
remains fledgling and disparate in the various countries involved – constitute far more than a
mere come-back for the communications technologies sector, and lie at the heart of many
issues relating to the Information Society itself.
The creation of a high-speed access market has also become a key indicator of the existing
regulatory framework’s ability to organize competition on the telecom services market. As
was to be expected, deregulation in 1998 manifested itself, above all, in investments made in
alternative infrastructures by players come to compete with incumbent operators on the trunk
and international markets. While open competition appears to now be a reality on these
markets – given that former monopolies have all lost a substantial share of control – in both
Europe and the US, incumbents operating on the local telephony and access markets generally
continue to enjoy a clearly dominant position.
This domination derives in large part from the investments that are required to deploy an
alternative access network, coupled with the difficulty in achieving a return on investment on
this deployment – including innovative services such as high-speed internet access.
Investments in alternative networks have been limited to major business centres and
conditioned by the required upgrades to cable networks. It is for this reason that, parallel to
the establishment of interconnection and call pre-selection regulations, regulators have
deemed the local telephone loop an essential facility and imposed its unbundling.
The aim of this article is twofold. We will first offer up an intermediary and provisional view
of the situation that has arisen from the application of unbundling and, second, provide an
analysis of the high-speed investment strategies (xDSL, cable, WLL) of new entrants
operating in Europe’s major countries. Unbundling the local loop gives rise to a number of
operational issues; here, we will focus primarily on the aspects linked to its implementation
and will discuss, most notably, the strategies both relating and unrelated to tariffs that
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incumbent operators are applying. The state of national markets, and particularly the many
bankruptcies among new entrants, will be addressed with respect to the efficiency of current
regulatory frameworks.
This paper will be structured as follows: the second section will take stock of the organization
of the telecommunications market in Europe by discussing the two exceptions which are the
development of cable telephony in the UK and the phenomenal growth of the mobile
telephony market. The third section will analyse the implementation of unbundling in Europe
by focusing particularly on initial results and on the development of high-speed access. The
fourth section will discuss the efficiency of regulatory regimes. The final section will offer up
concluding remarks.
1. Assessment of the organization of the telecommunications market in
Europe’s major countries
1.1. Telecom Europe
Ever since Europe’s telecom market was deregulated in 1998, new entrants have focused their
investments primarily on operations linked to routing long-distance and international traffic.
Within months, these new operators had created a great many offers come to compete with
those marketed by the incumbents. Offers continued to proliferate as operators authorized to
enter the market deployed their networks and signed interconnection agreements with the
incumbent.
Table 1 illustrates total market share by segment of activity (local, long-distance and
international) in 2001, for the UK, France, Germany and Spain.
Table 1: Share of the total market, by segment (%), in volume, in 2001
Local LD International Total
The UK
- BT
- Other
71.8
28.2
49.9
50.1
32.7
67.3
64.6
35.4
France
- FT
- Other
99*
1*
72.2*
27.8*
67.8*
32.2*
-
-
Germany
- DT
- Other
96.9
3.1
60
40
46
54
67*
33*
Spain
- Telefonica
- Other
-
-
-
-
-
-
87*
13*
* 2000 figure.
Source: IDATE.
The data included in this table indicates that incumbent operators in Europe have lost a
substantial share of the long-distance and international telephony markets. This phenomenon
is the most pronounced in the UK: in 2001, BT had a 49.9% share of the long-distance market3
was and a 32.7% share of the international market. While less pronounced than in the UK, the
effect of competition on these two segments in Germany is nonetheless significant since
Deutsche Telekom’s market shares in 2001 dropped to 60% and 46% on the long-distance and
international markets, respectively. In France, competition was less intense, with France
Telecom maintaining a fairly large share of both markets: 72.2% and 67.8%, respectively.
While it appears that competition in Europe has clearly developed on the long-distance
market, incumbent operators continue to dominate the local calling market by a sizeable
margin. The optical local loops deployed in Europe’s major business centres still only
represents a small portion of the market. Colt, the leading pan-European operator specialized
in this segment, posted a turnover of € 1,450M in 2001.
In 2000, France Telecom boasted a 99% share of the local market, while Deutsche Telekom
controlled 96.9% of its local calling market in 2001. In Spain, Telefonica’s share of this
market is, a priori, very high given that it holds an 87% overall share of the market. Lastly, in
the UK, British Telecom continues to maintain a relatively sizeable share of the local calling
segment (71.8%), when compared to its share of the long-distance market.
It should nevertheless be pointed out that this initial analysis applies only to fixed telephony
and, consequently, does not take into account alternative modes of telephony which now
include cellular. We shall come back to this further on.
Equally worth underlining is the fact that the recent introduction of local call pre-selection –
very recent in the UK and France, and not likely to become effective in Germany until early
2003 – may well have a very significant impact on alternative operators’ revenues.
The preceding figures therefore show that in the UK, while still in a dominant position with
respect to local calls, British Telecom has a much smaller share of its home market than
France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom do. This observation serves to underline the particular
landscape in the UK where deregulation of telephony services took place earlier than in other
European countries, and where there has been considerable incentive to invest in the local
loop via cable telephony.
1.2 Cable operators in the UK
The UK is in fact home to a form of exception concerning the local loop, on the one hand, and
to considerable cable development, on the other – made concrete through the deployment of
multi-service platforms that were quick to incorporate telephony and internet access services.
This particular feature is tied to the technological options that were adopted for the
deployment the infrastructures of those British cable operators who hold a services operator
license for copper pair-based networks. These ancient infrastructures were gradually
upgraded, particularly in view of broadcasting digitised audiovisual programmes and
providing high-speed access to the net.
Table 2 indicates the growth of cable telephony in the UK, between December 1997 and
December 2001.4
Table 2: Growth of cable telephony in the UK in % of lines
Dec. 97 Dec. 98 Dec. 99 Dec. 00 Dec. 01
Residential lines
- BT
- Cable operators
87.1
8.3
84.6
10.3
81.5
13.4
81.3
18
81.5
17.9
Professional lines
- BT
- Cable operators
89.6
2.8
88.6
3.7
89.2
3.3
88.1
5
88
5.2
Total
- BT
- Cable operators
87.8
6.9
85.7
8.5
83.6
10.6
83.3
14.3
83.4
14.2
Source: OFTEL.
Cable operators’ market share grew considerably between December 1997 and December
2001, having more than doubled: increasing from 6.9% to 14.2%. It is on the residential
market in particular that competition amongst cable operators has developed; by last
December their share of this segment had reached 17.9%. We should nevertheless point to the
serious financial difficulties being experienced by Telewest and NTL, which have resulted in
a high concentration of the cable sector, and a relative levelling-off of BT’s loss of its share of
phone lines over the last few months. Similar to what transpired on the other side of the
Atlantic, concentration of Britain’s cable industry led OFTEL to conduct a consultation in late
1999, focusing on the opportunity to impose the principle of Open Access on cable operators,
a fact which would require them to open up access to their local networks according to a
model similar to the one applied to copper pair unbundling. The consultation, which covered
all of the services that could potentially be offered via cable (TV, interactive TV, telephony
and internet) culminated in the publication of a document in April 2001. This document
specifies the three conditions needed to impose such a principle:
-  a cable operator’s market power on a given market must be significant;
-  the costs for implementing this regulatory policy must be compensated by the
expected profits;
-  the open access requirement must be an efficient and proportionate measure that
enables increased development of competition.
OFTEL nonetheless concluded this report by stating that cable operators did not hold
significant market power, added to which, in January 2001, the condition of exclusive
distribution for franchises was removed with the goal of stimulating competition, allowing
operators to market their services throughout the country.
While investments in cable in the UK worked as a considerable lever for competition on the
residential telephony market, two issues at least remain:
-  to what extent has the support given to investments in cable hampered OFTEL’s
efforts to implement efficient rules for unbundling phone lines? their efforts to back
precocious application of equal access procedures on the telephone market, procedures
such as call pre-selection that makes it possible to avoid using a code to access an
alternative operator’s local or long-distance services?
-  Does the triple play model (audiovisual programmes, telephony, internet) allow cable
to achieve an economic balance coming up, most notably, against satellite platforms’
audiovisual offerings?5
1.3 Competition in the mobile telephony sector
The mobile telephony market has grown substantially over the past few years, and continues
to grow at a relatively steady pace – despite early signs of decelerating that appeared in 2000,
compared to previous years. Since the early 1990s, the number of cellular subscribers in
Western Europe has increased by over 50% annually on average, with certain countries
posting a much higher rate than this. Forecasts established by IDATE nevertheless indicate
that, in the coming years, and in light of the penetration rates that have already been achieved,
annual growth of the subscriber base will diminish throughout Europe. While growth rates
were high in 2000, in Germany, France Italy and the UK – 91%, 47.6%, 33.8% and 51%,
respectively – Table 3 shows that the annual growth rates for these same countries are
expected to be much lower in 2004: roughly 8%, 10%, 5% and 8%, respectively.
Table 3: Growth in the number of cellular subscribers in Europe (in millions)
1998 1999 2000 2004*
Germany 14 23.1 44.2 60.1
France 11.1 20.6 30.4 44.5
Italy 20 30.4 40.7 49.5
UK 13 23.9 36.1 49.1
Source: IDATE.
* forecast.
The spectacular increase in the number of cellular subscribers in Europe translates directly
into a very high rate of penetration for mobile. At the end of 2000, cellular telephony’s
penetration rate in Europe had reached 63%, much higher than in Japan (46%) or the US
(40%). This growth is such that, since 2000, the number of mobile subscribers has exceeded
the number of fixed subscribers in several European countries. The figures presented in Table
4 indicate that this phenomenon was consolidated in 2001: in France, for instance, the mobile
subscriber base outnumbered fixed line accesses for the first time by a ratio of 1:1.01. Of all
European nations, Italy is the most exemplary of this phenomenon, with a ratio of 1:1.72 in
2001.
Table 4: Fixed versus cellular lines in Europe, end of 2001
In millions
Number of fixed
subscribers (1)
Number of cellular
subscribers (2)
(2)/(1)
Germany 49.4 56.3 1.14
France 35.0 35.4 1.01
Italy 26.7 45.8 1.72
UK 36.1 44.5 1.23
Source: IDATE.
According to IDATE, in terms of call volume, calculated in minutes, mobile traffic in 2000
represented close to 13% of fixed traffic in the UK, 24% in France and 15% in Spain. In a
great many countries, however, we can discern a trend toward decreasing volume of fixed
telephony calling minutes, thus pointing to substitution by cellular networks.6
In terms of value, and despite a clear trend over the last few years of lowering ARPU (average
revenue per user), mobiles account for an increasingly large share of the telecom services
market.
Table 5: Mobile’s share of the telecom market (in %)
2000 2001
Germany 38.3 43.6
Spain 43 .3 49.1
France 38.8 42.9
Italy 48.1 51.5
UK 30.8 35.1
Total 39.2 43.2
Source: IDATE
Lastly, it would be worth characterizing incumbent operators’ presence on the mobile
telephony market. The world atlas of mobiles, published by IDATE, indicates that at the end
of 2001, incumbent operators’ share of mobile subscribers on their national market does not
point to a clear domination on their part. In most European countries, with the exception of
Spain, they have an average share of roughly 50%. In France, the incumbent has an estimated
48.2% share of the mobile market, in Italy: 47.6%, in Germany: 41.2% and, lastly, in the UK:
23.5%. This trend is expected to further confirm itself, even though the inflation of licenses
upon the advent of 3G cellular systems is likely to trigger a major consolidation movement on
Europe’s mobile market.
Even when dominated by a relatively oligopolistic organization, which justifies regulators’
vigilance, mobiles no doubt now constitute the most significant expression of deregulation of
the telecom sector.
Furthermore, this growth and competition dynamic is expected to be increasingly heightened
with the unveiling of new services that are planned to accompany the introduction of 3G
networks. Even though the launch of pioneer networks has been delayed and W-CDMA’s
performances will be only gradually enhanced, the functionalities and bitrates offered will
further accentuate the overlap of fixed and cellular telecommunications. In other words, the
position of those players operating on high-speed markets should be examined in light of the
offers and positions they have forged on cellular networks.
2. Application of unbundling in Europe’s major countries
Incumbent operators’ domination of the local loop was the primary source of the European
regulation of December 2000 which imposed unbundling of telephone lines, thereby
recognizing them as an essential facility. This regulation was particularly motivated by the
fear of seeing incumbent operators’ dominance of classic phone services extend to new high-
speed services markets. Here we will first then examine the implementation of unbundling in
major European nations, in terms of both the process itself and initial results.7
2.1. The unbundling process and initial results
Incumbent operators’ obligation to open up access to their local loop, as mandated by
regulators – that must enable new entrants to market data services without having to build
their own local loop – holds major implications with respect to xDSL (see 2.2).
A great many processes for implementing unbundling are possible. The most radical solution
allows alternative operators to control the copper pair, either fully or in terms of the
bandwidth that corresponds to DSL services (“shared line”). In the case where an alternative
offer includes analogue telephony, the incumbent is no longer able to bill end users.
On the other end of the unbundling spectrum is the resale of telephone operator services. For a
high-speed solution in this case, alternative operators distribute the incumbent’s DSL service.
Here, ISPs’ focus is on equal treatment being given to those ISPs which are incorporated with
the incumbent and to competing ISPs. Lastly, let us note an intermediary solution known as
bitstream access whereby the incumbent provides the new entrant with the bitstream that
corresponds to his data traffic.
With respect to the financial aspects of unbundling, available data indicates that there exists a
certain disparity in the tariffs applied by the various incumbent operators around Europe.
Although the different tariff components vary from one country to the next, it is possible to
break these tariffs down into three parts:
-  monthly line leasing costs,
-  connection (and possibly disconnection) fees,
-  equipment co-location costs.
The various tariffs presented in Table 6 allow us to make several comparisons – albeit only
approximate in light of the preceding remarks – of fully unbundled access rates in Europe. In
Germany, Spain and Italy, for instance, the monthly cost of leasing an unbundled line is
comparable: 12.48, 13 and 11.62 euros, respectively. In the UK and France, these rates are
much higher: 16.67 and 14.48 euros, respectively.
While the price of unbundled lines must be viewed with respect to the costs shouldered by the
lines’ owners, in order to assess its impact on competition, we must also take into account the
retail price of the corresponding service, as marketed to end users by the incumbent operator.
Table 6 gives us an idea of the price squeezing conducted for fully unbundled access.
Unbundling tariffs are higher than the retail prices applied by incumbents, the difference
being roughly 12% to 13%, depending on the country. This observation has led a number of
new entrants to file a complaint with either the European Commission or national competition
authorities. It is worth noting that these differences give rise to questions concerning the level
of tariff rebalancing which has now been achieved in Europe. To be pertinent – and given that
unbundled lines are integrated by alternative operators into a competing high-speed or LL
substitution offering – this assessment must also be associated with an evaluation of
differences in the retail rates being charged by incumbents for (x)DSL and leased line (LL)
services.8
Table 6: Fully unbundled access tariffs, versus retail price, in 2001 in Europe
Monthly rental (euros) Margin (%)
Country
Connection
fee
Disconnection
fee Unbundled
Access
Retail Price (RP)/(UA)
France 107.90 (*) - 14.48 (*) 12.55 -13%
Germany 92.59 38.07 12.48 10.94 -12%
Spain - - 13.00 11.40 -12%
Italy 90.07 41.83 11.62 - -
UK 196 46.55 16.67 14.60 -12%
European average - - 12.35 12.53 1%
Source: E.U.
(*) In May 2002, the ART imposed a decrease to € 78.70 on connection fees, to € 10.50 for full unbundling,
along with a drop from € 6.10 to € 2.87 for partial unbundling (line sharing).
In both Europe and the US, the complexity of these evaluations, coupled with those involved
in establishing practical and operation rules for unbundling – in a context where incumbent
operators have little reason to favour opening up their infrastructure – have led to a generally
slow rate of development for unbundled lines. In all European Union countries combined,
only 0.2% of phone lines have been unbundled. Table 7 presents the number of fully
unbundled lines in five European countries, at the end of 2001.
Table 7: Number of fully unbundled lines, end of 2001
Number of lines Number of fully
unbundled lines
France 34,000,000 400
Germany 49,400,000 400,000
Italy 25,990,000 1,000
Spain 20,320,000 7
UK 28,500,000 137
Sources: ART, ECTA.
2.2. Development of high-speed access modes
More than a year behind developments being made in the US, 2001 was the stage for high-
speed’s first significant steps in Europe. To illustrate, we have chosen to focus on the three
main access platforms: DSL, cable modem and WLL technologies, after having recalled the
main features of the internet access market. This will lead to an initial assessment of high-
speed developments in Europe.
2.2.1. Main features of internet dial-up access markets
The challenge facing unbundling derives in large part from the growth of internet access
which is still largely conducted over the phone networks’ copper pairs. Unbundling, which
constitutes a key phase in telecom deregulation, is expected to provide considerable impetus
to the high-speed internet access market.9
The internet has undergone phenomenal development, particularly in Europe, since the late
1990s. Table 8 reveals that Europe’s internet markets have all enjoyed relatively high growth
rates. In France, the market increased by 65% in 2001, in Germany by 42% and in Spain by
40%. This considerable growth, in large part relative to the late start taken compared to the
US, was reinforced by the gradual introduction of new pricing options, based on notions of
free access (supported by interconnection agreements allowing alternative operators to earn
from “free”ISPs, and by expected advertising or spin-off revenues). This was followed by a
partial transition (that was more or less smooth depending on the country) to flat rate offers
that include local calling charges and the subscription to an ISP.
Table 8: Evolution of internet markets’ growth rates, in Europe (1999-2001)
1999 2000 2001
France 70% 83% 65%
Germany 78% 69% 42%
Italy 76% 58% 39%
Spain 50% 47% 40%
UK 65% 42% 30%
Source: IDATE.
In this context of high growth for internet markets, it is nevertheless worth noting the often
considerable share of the ISP market acquired by incumbent operators. Table 9 presents the
market share controlled by each country’s top three ISPs.
Table 9: Incumbent operators’ share of their national internet dial-up access market, in 2001
Country Market share Country Market share
France
- Wanadoo (FT)
- LibertySurf
-AOL
35%
18%
15%
Spain
- Terra Lycos (Telefonica)
- Retevision/EresMas
- Ya.com
37%
20%
12%
Germany
- T Online (DT)
- AOL
- Freenet
43%
15%
11.5%
The UK*
- Freeserve
- AOL
- BT
18%
17%
15%
Italy
- New Wind
- Tin.it/Virgilio Tin (TI)
- Tiscali
40%
32%
20%
Sources: IDATE
* Share of the residential market (in % of subscribers).
In Germany, Spain and France, the incumbent enjoys a relatively large share of the market. In
Germany, for instance, T Online’s 43% share allows incumbent Deutsche Telekom to
dominate the national internet access market. Incumbent France Telecom’s ISP Wanadoo also
boasts a relatively large share of the French market with 35%, compared to the second-ranked10
ISP which holds an 18% share. Similarly, Spanish incumbent Telefonica’s ISP Terra Lycos
controls 37% of subscribers. In Italy, however, the incumbent has an only 32% share, second
to rival New Wind which boasts a 40% share of the country’s internet subscribers.
The only exception to this market domination by a single operator is the UK where the
internet market is far less concentrated than elsewhere, and where the incumbent can lay
claim to only 15% control.
2.2.2. (x)DSL service offerings in Europe
Since mid-2000, then, high-speed access has become a priority for all of Europe’s internet
players. Faced with a host of technological solutions that currently make it possible to provide
high-speed access (DSL, cable modem, WLL), DSL technologies are those which enjoyed the
highest rate of increase in Europe in 2001, keeping in mind marked disparities in national
situations. Of all European countries, Germany boasts the greatest number of deployed ADSL
lines: a little over 2 million. After Germany come France and Italy, albeit with far fewer lines
– numbering a half a million.
Overall, and comparable to the situation in the US, the emerging DSL market is currently
dominated by incumbent operators in most European countries, with market shares of
between 90% and 95%
The complexity and sluggishness of unbundling, referred to here above, are often held up to
explain this situation. It should nevertheless be noted that in a country such as Germany,
which has been operating under unbundling regulations for some years now, only a very small
portion of unbundled lines are used by Deutsche Telekom’s rival DSL operators.
The brutal reversal of fortune that telecom operators experienced when the internet bubble
burst in 2000 also triggered a considerable shift in the landscape. In those countries, such as
the UK, where there were over 30 candidates seeking to market DSL services using
unbundled lines, there are now only three or four alternative operators present on BT’s
premises.
The failure of leading American DSL players, including Covad, NorthPoint and Rhythm – all
of which crumbled under the weight of deficits that grew parallel to the increase of marketed
lines, coupled with investors’ and financial markets’ new-found reticence – gave European
candidates pause to reflect on the viability of the pure player model. Under this model, a DSL
operator owns neither the lines nor the clientele since his customer is an ISP or a long-
distance operator. At the same time, he is committed to often massive investments that
frequently require large technical crews as well. He must therefore – and this point has
become crucial – shoulder the risks of lost earnings from those customers (ISPs, long-distance
operators) who have become insolvent.
In this context, then, we can discern an approach being taken by European players (other than
incumbents) which reflects a heightened awareness of the commercial and financial risks
involved. They are committing to investments that are confined to large cities; they are
targeting a corporate clientele which allows them to play on quality of service (or on features
such as SDSL symmetrical access) and thereby enjoy higher margins, or they are
incorporating the DSL offering into a value chain that includes long-distance services,
webhosting, etc.11
It would be equally wise to take a closer look at the development of competition on the DSL
market in the coming months – particularly on the residential market – and to compare the
number of lines marketed by the incumbent operator with the number of high-speed internet
accesses marketed by their subsidiary ISP. This would make it possible to measure the market
that is likely to emerge in terms of resale of the incumbents’ DSL offers. In France, for
instance, France Telecom stated some 420,000 DSL lines at the end of 2001, while its
subsidiary Wanadoo announced that it was serving 370,000 DSL subscribers (along with
45,000 broadband internet via cable subscribers). In November of that year, France’s second-
ranked ISP, Club Internet (a T-Online subsidiary) stated that it had 30,000 DSL subscribers.
2.2.3. Alternative technologies
DSL is not the only means for marketing high-speed access. In business centres in major
European and American cities, operators have deployed fibre optic networks that respond to
large corporations’ connection needs. Our thoughts on competition on the local loop will not
be expressed in this paper, even if an evaluation of this phenomenon is well warranted. Let us
only offer up, by way of illustration, the 2001 turnover of Europe’s leading operators in this
field: Colt (1450M￿).
Here, satellite as well, when combined with the phone network or using a two-way
configuration, has the potential to be serving the 20% of the European continent which, for
the decade to come, will not be covered by DSL infrastructures, although its impact remains
marginal for the meantime.
Our comments on possibilities for additional competition over subscriber access will therefore
remain confined to cable, which has already been addressed with respect to the UK, and to the
wireless local loop (WLL).
Cable modem
In the first part of this paper, we discussed at some length the British exception with respect to
the role that cable operators play in competition on the local loop. We shall now take a
broader look at the alternative solution offered by cable networks in Europe.
For some time now, faced with the difficulties of implementing efficient unbundling, cable
networks have become the focus of government and regulators, refuelling the debate over the
importance of investments in infrastructure-based competition.
We already know that the cable situation diverges widely across Europe. While certain
countries such as Belgium boast 90% cable coverage, the technology is virtually non-existent
in Greece. Taking a look at major national markets, Table 10 here below indicates that the
number of marketable sockets and the subscription rates in these countries are equally
disparate. Nevertheless, the proportion of homes passed for cable is by no means negligible,
and therefore justifies the European Commission’s early desire to see incumbent telephony
operators withdrawal from the sector. This preamble, which applies particularly to France and
Germany, is on the verge of becoming a reality, despite the fact that Deutsche Telekom’s sale
of 60% of its shares to Liberty Media was recently delayed and that France Telecom still
controls a significant share of the sockets that it continues to operate, in addition to a large
share of the networks operated by the country’s number three cable operator NC-
Numericable.12
Table 10: Size of cable networks in 2001 (in thousands)
Number of marketable
sockets
(1)
Number of
subscribing homes
Number of fixed
subscribers
(2)
(1)/(2)
Germany 34,650 22,240 49,400 70%
France 8,700 3,130 34,000 25.6%
Italy 1,040 70 25,990 4%
Spain 2,080 480 20,320 10.2%
UK 16,590 3,770 28,500 58.2%
Sources: IDATE, MMTV.
Network ownership is not, however, the only obstacle preventing cable from becoming a
vehicle for competition on the telephony and high-speed internet markets. In a great many
countries, such as Belgium and Germany, cable is still regulated by a public utility model.
Even when marketing audiovisual offers, cable operators are forced to play the relatively
transparent role of distributor.
If we then consider those countries whose cable networks are governed by more ambitious
approaches, derived from what we know of cable in the US, and particularly well illustrated in
the UK and France, we may well balk at the ongoing investments required to finance
upgrades, migrating channels to digital, high-speed internet and the distribution of the
associated set-top boxes and cable modems… while competition amongst satellite television
bouquets is increasingly dynamic. This is true to such an extent that 1) companies such as
UPC, NTL and Telewest have reached unsustainable levels of debt that are likely to impede
marketing of internet services and 2) it appears unlikely that, in the medium term, we will
witness a significant renewed round of investments that would help develop cable networks in
those countries where they are absent.
Given these conditions, then, the number of web subscribers via cable modem remained
relatively low in 2001, and this across Europe: roughly 200,000 for Germany, France and the
UK and only 100,000 in Spain. Forecasts calculated by IDATE (cf. Table 12) on the growth
of internet cable modem subscribers reveal a market potential for this technology which is
well under that which has been observed and forecast for the North American market.
The WLL
WLL presents itself as a wireless technology that operates independently of telephone and
cable. It nevertheless requires the deployment of high point equipment that offer a direct line
of sight with client premises. It does however make it possible to create offers of
simultaneous links providing speeds of up to 8Mbps, in other words faster than the
transmission speeds offered by DSL or cable modem.
Despite these assets, the year 2001 was relatively disappointing for Wireless Local Loop
technology which had been the focus of a number of projects in Europe. By the end of 2001,
operators in Germany, France and Spain were marketing commercial offers, although the
number of subscribers remains very low: only several thousand (cf. Table 11). In the UK and
Italy, license allocation is only partially complete and not yet definitive; in any case, no
service is currently available.13
Table 11: WLL operator presence in Europe (2001)
Number of subscribers
Germany 6,000
France 1,500
Italy -
Spain 3,100
the UK
Source: IDATE.
WLL technology became operational later than cable modem and DSL. Operators were
therefore hit hard when the bottom fell out of the telecom market. The euphoria over a host of
projects (encouraged by a model of licensing in Germany dominated by micro-, or reginal
licences) gave way to bankruptcies – particularly in Germany (FirstMark, Associated Com
/Teligent and Calino /Formus) while in Spain and France, the sector underwent drastic
consolidation, and this even before the infrastructures had been deployed.
Europe’s surviving WLL players must now demonstrate that the frequencies in all areas for
which they hold licences are in use, or face losing them without compensation. For the
regulatory and licensing authorities, question is to decide if they have to take back spectrum,
or to change the licences conditions.
Table 12: Growth of the total high-speed subscriber base (consumer + corporate)
 (consolidation of the 17 EU countries)
In millions of subscribers
2001* 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
WLL
- best case scenario
- worst case scenario
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
1.2
0.7
2.9
1.6
5.7
2.9
DSL
- best case scenario
- worst case scenario
5
5
15
13
22
18
30
22
40
28
50
34
Cable
- best case scenario
- worst case scenario
2
2
4
4
5
5
8
6
10
7
13
9
Total
- best case scenario
- worst case scenario
7
7
19.1
17.1
27.2
23.2
39.2
28.7
52.9
36.6
68.7
45.9
* 2001 figures are recorded.
Source: IDATE.
Forecasts for the growth of the WLL subscriber base nonetheless project a relatively sizeable
development for this market in the years to come. Taking a look at Table 12, the number of
WLL subscribers is expected to increase from 0.1 million in 2002 to 2.9 million in 2006
(worst case scenario). Under the best case scenario, however, the WLL subscriber base would
be close to nine times smaller than DSL’s in 2006.14
Leased Lines
Although rarely cited when we identify the various types of high-speed access, leased lines
(LL) are nonetheless the most common means used by medium-size enterprises for accessing
the net or for connecting the company’s web server. For this reason, they constitute the
starting point for all DSL and WLL sales pitches. Companies would be offered DSL access
running at 1 Mbps for the price of a 512 Kbps leased line. For alternative operators involved
on the corporate market, and who are often required to pay the cost of LL imposed by the
incumbent for connecting to their customers, DSL access (and singularly SDSL) represents a
way for them to lower the bill without cutting their margin.
It is true that in Europe’s leading business centres there exist optical network alternatives to
the incumbents’ LL. Incumbent operators must nevertheless arbitrate between the benefits of
maintaining the comfortable margins imposed on leased lines for as long as possible while, on
the other hand, valorising their DSL platforms and staving off the rise of competing solutions.
Table 13: Elements of rate comparison for short-distance LL (under 3 km)
 (total for line set up + subscription)
In euros
512 Kbit/s 1 Mbit/s 2 Mbit/s
Deutsche Telekom 6,054 - 14,279
France Telecom 11,859 13,846 14,360
Telecom Italia 10,494 - 12,496
Telefonica 8,104 14,211 15,216
British Telecom 9,490 12,157 14,279
Source: IDATE.
Table 13 presents the main elements for comparing short-distance LL tariffs.
3. The efficiency of regulatory regimes
The brief overview that we have just given quite clearly reveals incumbent operators’
dominance of the local access market. Even though patience is required, as a look back over
GSM’s very gradual development in France will ascertain, all evidence points to the fact that
the application of unbundling and new entrants’ strategies for investing in high-speed have yet
prove themselves.
Far more than a mere problem of competition on the telecommunications market, local access
is now at the heart of a much broader debate over the connection between the rate of
innovation and distribution in the ICT sector, and the degree of openness to competition on
the more downstream networks segment. More specifically, we have shifted from a
microeconomic view of the issue, where the goal was to stimulate competition in
telecommunications by promoting the development of high-speed access, to a far more
political objective (G. Le Blanc (2001)). This political objective consists, most particularly, of
grasping the regulatory regimes that support facilities-based entry and/or services-based entry15
as a means for driving innovation and accelerating the new technologies’ penetration rate,
seeking to reach a macroeconomic growth objective.
Speaking more generally, in order to judge the efficiency of regulatory regimes, we must
properly distinguish their static efficiency – based on minimisation of costs and the
enhancement of the quality of service offered to end users – from their dynamic efficiency
which is based on the rate of innovation and on the level of investments being made in new
technologies. At first glance, the quest for dynamic efficiency appears to be favoured largely
by policies that target the development of competition amongst infrastructures. To judge the
efficiency of regulatory regimes it is therefore important to discern both entrants’ incentive to
invest and to evaluate incumbent operators’ investment strategies.
With respect to the first point – as Jorde, Sidak and Teece (2000) and Crandall and Hausman
(2000) have pointed out – the juxtaposition of the two policies, one which drives facilities-
based competition and the other services-based competition, would lead to a bias for entrants’
decisions that favours the most radical unbundling solutions (cf. infra section 2.1).
Unbundling, particularly when associated with regulation that seeks to align prices with cost,
will naturally diminish entrants’ incentive to invest in infrastructure. The subsequent impact is
well documented in the latest economic literature on innovation and the theory of real options
(see, for example Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Dixit (1995)): the risks tied to investing in new
technologies favours imitation over innovation, particularly when regulators require that the
price of unbundled access by aligned with costs. Here, unbundling creates a second-mover
advantage and substantially reduces entrants’ incentive to shoulder a sunk investment.
Potential competition may therefore prefer unbundling to investing in alternative
infrastructures.
This same literature offers up arguments that lead one to conclude that imposing access
unbundling reduces incumbent operators’ incentive to invest in existing facilities and in new
technologies. More specifically, regulatory imposition of unbundling whose price is based
entirely on cost may well lead to diminished incentives for at least two reasons. The first
argument derives directly from the rules governing investment decisions which, for
companies, consist of arbitrating between the hoped-for return and the risk of failure
associated with the investment project. To be precise, basing the price of unbundled access
offers on cost, invariably reduces the company’s probability of generating a high return. The
second argument, which makes it possible to establish a correlation between incumbent
operators’ loss of incentive to invest and unbundling, consists of underlining the fact that
setting tariffs based on cost virtually eradicates the cost advantage that would ensue from this
investment. This regulatory principle in fact ensures a constant ratio between marginal costs,
those of the incumbent and those of the entrant; despite investments and the drop in marginal
cost which may result, the value of this ratio is the same, ex-ante and ex-post. This clearly
constitutes a hindrance to the competition dynamic since the incumbent operator has no
incentive to invest in a technology that reduces its own marginal cost, while its competitors
can obtain the same economy thanks to regulatory provisions. This potential loss of dynamic
efficiency then leads to a distorted view of consumers’ well-being due to the cost of
opportunity tied to the absence of improved quality that the investment could have produced.
This discussion hints at the conclusion that, at first glance, unbundling hampers incentives to
invest in existing networks as well as in new technologies. We must nonetheless remain very
prudent in the way we interpret these various arguments, to the extent that here we have
provided only partial analysis of the impact. Our statements have focused primarily on a16
highly microeconomic aspect of investment decisions, without taking into account the fact
that these regulatory regimes are generally associated with industrial policies that seek to
create incentives – through often very complex economic policy leveraging – for firms to
invest and innovate (A. Jacquemin and L. Pench (2001)).
Up until now, we have supposed a perfect correlation between facilities-based competition
and firms’ investment. In other words, at no point did we wonder whether a policy of
facilities-based competition indeed leads inexorably to efficient sums and rates of investment
in local networks and to the adoption of the most advanced technologies. It would be well
worth addressing this aspect here now.
There is a relative wealth of theoretical economic literature on facilities-based entry’s effect
on industrial investments. The literature generally distinguishes non-strategic from strategic
motives.
The classic approach is to regroup non-strategic investments into three categories: renewal
investments, growth investments and upgrade investments. The issue that interests us above
all in this article is most certainly linked to the last category of investments whose most
marked characteristic is their very high level of cost and associated risks. From the incumbent
operator’s standpoint, the prime motive appears to be the regulatory variable, through the
definition of norms or certification of procedures, for instance. It clearly ensues that
regulation will have a direct impact on the development facilities-based investments.
Similarly, for entrants a certain number of investment motives are disconnected from purely
strategic aspects. In an open network environment, entrants are free to choose their
technology(ies), their level of entry as well as those markets which they will truly enter. In the
same vein, they can elect the unbundling solution, as well as its degree, to install their own
facilities or even to deploy a combination of the two.
Parallel to these non-strategic motives, a certain number of investments form an integral part
of incumbent operators’ and entrants’ strategies. A great many writings have focused on the
strategic nature of incumbents’ investment decisions when faced with competitive pressure
from potential entrants. In this case, the investment can serve as an entry barrier strategy that
allows the incumbent to dissuade entry due to the additional costs it entails. More specifically,
incumbent firms have the choice between discouraging entry by over-investing and
accommodating entry by opting for a better investment strategy, knowing that entry will take
place. Choosing between these two alternatives depends precisely on the nature of the
technologies, on consumers’ preferences and on the regulatory stipulations in effect on the
market in question (Spence (1977), Dixit (1979) and Tirole (1988), among others). For their
part, entrants can also elect to invest strategically. These strategies are illustrated by entry for
buyout strategies, for instance, which have been used widely by competitive access providers
(CAPs). This strategy corresponds to a certain extent to entrants taking a speculative approach
to certain investments. More specifically, it involves entrants investment in “growth”
technologies in the hope of later selling them to other firms or of an eventual takeover.
Several CAPs have thus been taken over by TV cable operators and, more recently, by long-
distance operators (Woroch (1998)).
While the theoretical literature conveys the strong presumption that facilities-based
competition stimulates investment, the results of empirical studies in the field are more
contrasted. Overall, the hypotheses that underlie the results of theoretical models do not
appear to have been verified empirically for a great many industries (Geroski (1995)).17
Traditionally, in a certain number of cases studied, the econometric tests do not manage to
establish a clear link between entry and a drop in prices pre or post entry, and its purportedly
negative effect on the incumbent firm’s profits. Along with this is the fact that the results
concerning the level and rate of investments seem, to a certain degree, to be even less firmly
established (Taylor, Zarkadas and Zona (1992), Greenstein, Mc Master and Spiller (1995),
Ros (1999)). There nevertheless exist several studies specific to the telecommunications
sector and which provide a more precise view of the relationship. Such is notably the case of
Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller (1995) who demonstrate there is indeed a link between
facilities-based competition and incumbent operators’ investment decisions. This relationship
is, however, minimal. Other works, more focused on cellular telephony services and fibre
optics indicate that this type of link can be established (see for instance Dekimpe, Parker and
Sarvary (1998) or Woroch (2000)).
All of these studies are embryonic to the extent that we still do not have the required hindsight
(nor volume of data), given the relatively recent application of facilities-based entry.
Regulatory authorities must adopt a very cautious attitude in light of the many uncertainties
surrounding the rate of innovation and the direction being taken by innovative processes, in
addition to those surrounding new and long-standing consumers’ behaviour.
4. Concluding remarks
Several years after opening Europe’s telecommunications markets up to competition, the local
telephony market remains largely dominated by incumbent operators. Local call pre-selection
was introduced far too recently to be able to assess the impact that it will eventually have,
while cable telephony remains largely confined to the UK where it targets primarily
residential customers. Even in this country where deregulation came into effect early on and
where business centres were rapidly equipped with optical loops, the incumbent operator, BT,
still controls 70% of the local calling market. Lastly, the introduction of cellular telephony
onto the telecom services market brought about a significant decline in incumbent’s power.
Hasty though it was, our look at the internet and high-speed access markets does not make it
possible to state that these services will lead to the swift creation of a competitive landscape,
regardless of the technology deployed.
Today, there is no explicit relationship between the maturity of the unbundling process in a
given market and CLECs’ share of high-speed access market. There is also currently no
explicit relationship between unbundling and the speed of creation of a broadband access
market. Korea, which is the world’s leader with more than 50% of the households using high-
speed access, primarily via DSL lines, began implementing unbundling rules in late 2001. The
Korean government’s very dynamic public policy to promote demand and to encourage
operator’s investments was crucial.
Given the complexity involved in implementing unbundling rules, it is quite natural that
incumbent operators have generally taken a significant lead in marketing DSL access. In
recent troubled times, even the CLECs seem prefer use of a DSL wholesale platform to
launch their DSL services rather investing in DSLAM. It is nevertheless likely that – on the
corporate market initially (with the arrival of G.SHDSL technology) and later the consumer
market for the most solid ISPs – we will witness a gradual decrease in the number of DSL
lines being billed by incumbents. On the residential market, the arrival of competitors could18
derive from the current massive consolidation of ISPs in Europe, given the impact of
economies of scale on the profitability of DSL offerings. Competition is also likely to issue
from the gradual creation of a market at the end user level that goes beyond merely billing
access, in other words a market of value-added services (video, music, e-commerce, e-
learning,…).  The introduction of voice over IP in the medium term (and VoDSL) also
constitutes a possible means for destabilizing incumbent operators as it would undermine
fixed earnings generated by phone line subscriptions.
In many large European cities, the greatest competition for incumbent operators’ high-speed
offerings on the residential market will come from cable operators’ broadband internet
services. As we have already indicated, however, major European cable operators’ current
level of debt may well hamper the widespread distribution of their internet and telephony
offerings.
We must also expect to feel the gradual impact of wireless technologies which include the still
difficult to establish development of WLL, the promise of 3G mobile as well as WiFi services
(802.11).
In the particularly difficult context that is currently being experienced by the entire telecom
sector, it also seems necessary to point out that a too great “impatience” on the part of public
authorities – seeking to pressure incumbent operators into lowering the price of DSL access,
for example – may well prove counterproductive.
Lastly, while it is true that regulators must remain circumspect in seeking to maintain an
efficiently competitive landscape, we find it impossible to adhere to certain convictions which
perceive in the current situation overt undermining of competition on the part of the natural
monopoly. The technological effervescence, which gives no indication of subsiding,
constitutes in itself a powerful vector for challenging acquired positions, benefiting
specialized players and often targeting a particular market. The serious crisis that the sector is
enduring should lead to the ultimate emergence of a smaller number of more solid rivals for
incumbent operators. Lastly, our conviction, in the wake of the early developments of
broadband services, is that the telecommunications services market will be more or less
closely intertwined with complex services being marketed to both consumer and corporate
customers, calling upon skills, brands and distribution networks that will all represent chances
to challenge the dominant position of the market’s most powerful players. It will not be a
perfect competitive market, and will require the ongoing vigilance of regulators and anti-trust
authorities, but neither will it continue to resemble the telephone network’s monopoly.
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